Job Market Paper
This paper introduces a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) agent. Our main result is that an RI agent who is forced to fulfill a quota never hires the candidates without acquiring information about them, unlike an unrestricted RI agent who in some cases bases her decision on prior belief only. We also find that in our context quotas are equivalent to other types of affirmative policies such as subsidies and blind resume policy. We show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidate, corrects for inaccurate beliefs and induces truthful type revelation by candidates.
Work in Progress
This paper studies a welfare maximization problem with heterogeneous agents. A social planner designs a menu of choices for agents who misperceive either the properties of options or their own preferences. When agents misperceive the true properties of alternatives, it is optimal to limit a menu when the probability of a mistaken choice is moderately high. Additionally, it could be optimal to construct the menu with more distinct alternatives. However, when agents misperceive their own tastes, it is optimal to limit choice only when agents choose randomly, and to propose alternatives that are more similar when there is a greater probability of agents making a mistake.
Rational Inattention to Value-Relevant Information in ETF
(with Mariia Kosar)
Inaccurate Beliefs, Attention and Affirmative Actions (with Francesco Capozza)
Political Platform Building with Rationally Inattentive Voters